MULTIAGENCY SECURITY OPERATIONS EFFECTIVENESS IN COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN NAIROBI CITY COUNTY, KENYA

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Full Length Research

ABSTRACT

Violent extremism is a global threat that has wreaked havoc on many countries, leading to immeasurable casualties and destruction. Kenya's fight against violent extremism employed a multiagency security strategy after a spate of deadly violent attacks between 2013 and 2020. The goal was to prevent, counter, and respond to violent attacks. Some studies were conducted concerning multiagency security operations and countering violent extremism. Despite the availability of past studies, few were conducted in the context of Kenya. Little was known about multiagency security operations' effectiveness in the fight against violent extremism since its inception. The study objectives were to determine the effects of coordination structures, resource mobilization and community mobilization, all within the multiagency framework, on countering violent extremism in Nairobi city county. The study was supported by; securitization, realism, and social capital theories. The main guide for the research was idealism and system principles in this study. The study's framework was a descriptive survey technique. A target population of 920 people was identified, including establishments dealing with violent extremism, the Directorate of Criminal Investigations, the Anti-terror police unit, the National Intelligence Service, and Kenya Defense Forces, from which 279 people were recruited to help accomplish the study. A combination of sampling procedures, including maximum variation, purposive, and snowball sampling, were used to pick the sample population. For this, Yamane's formula was utilized to calculate the sample size. Raw data were collected by the use of questionnaires. Instrument reliability was established using Cronbach's alpha Correlation Coefficient. The numeric data was evaluated using SPSS based on descriptive and inferential analyses, while qualitative data was examined in light of the themes that emerged from the study goals. The results of the data analysis were introduced using graphs, charts, and tables. Throughout the study, all ethical and legal requirements were maintained to protect the integrity of the findings. Of the 279 administered questionnaires, 261 were collected and analyzed, representing a 93.6 percent response rate. The 261 questionnaires formed the foundation for data analysis. The study findings established that coordination structures, resource mobilization, and community mobilization within the multiagency framework had a positive effect on countering violent extremism in Nairobi City County, Kenya. The study concluded that multiagency security operations were effective in countering violent extremism in Nairobi City County, Kenya. Finally, the study recommended government and the multiagency institution's leaders should commit to increasing resources, establishing clear standard operating procedures for the forces operating at the grassroots level, a clear leadership structure, and minimizing political interference to enhance multiagency security operations effectiveness in countering violent extremism in Nairobi City County, Kenya.

Key words: multiagency security operations and violent extremism

INTRODUCTION

Violent Extremism stands as a global security issue which became common around the 21st century. The global arena over the years has been battling with various terrorism activities which cut across countries hence making them trans-national in nature largely due to globalization. Due to radicalization spreading widely across regions, the international community has re-assessed the existing security systems in place with the aim of addressing the underlying threats challenging state monopoly (Lusiola, 2021). Many countries worldwide are confronted with a deluge of problems, the majority of which constitute a serious threat to humanity. Violent extremism (VE), in particular, is one of the challenges that countries must handle (Klima, Pauwels & Hardyns, 2021). Behind CVE, there is a notion that violent extremism should not be battled with absolute intelligence, police force, and armed forces. Also, there must be a structural undertaking of the source of violence, including government failure, intolerance, and political and economic marginalization. For that reason, therefore, counter violence extremism uses a no-coercive strategy to prevent individuals or groups from organizing for violence and reduce recruiting ideas motivated by terror (Schmid, 2011).

Post 9/11 attack in the United States, there has been law enforcement in different States within the USA to counter and respond to such instances in future. The CVE roles have been assumed by several states, who are concurrently dealing with various difficulties. This study aims to see how coordination structures affect Multiagency operations in preventing violent extremism in Kenya. Violent extremist organizations seek to destroy the rule of law and fundamental values that characterize society's morals, human rights, and democracy in most cases.

Many African countries are grappling with the growing threat of violent extremism; Nigeria, for example, is fighting violent extremists (Boko Haram). Many countries have developed independent police teams to confront the rising number of violent extremists, according to Syokila (2020). To enhance information sharing and increase reaction times, countries have devised the concept of multiagency operations for security. In order to strengthen information sharing and respond more effectively to improve their nations' safety by remaining proactive in attack response and deterrence, the content calls for the coordination, mobilization, and integration of various core security agencies and supporting organizations. The study aimed to check the effectiveness of coordination structures, resource and community mobilization within multiagency security operations on countering violent extremism in Kenya.

On April 5, 2014, the Kenyan government began "Operation Usalama Watch." A multiagency security operation focused on Mombasa town and Nairobi's Eastleigh region in response to a spate of violent extremist attacks across the country intended to identify Al-Shabaab adherents and combat violence extremism (Sarma ,2018) and (Syokila, 2020), (Klima et al., 2021); (Musoma, 2020). This research aims to explore how Kenya's struggle against violent extremism is influenced

by coordinating systems. Both areas were suspected of being the scene of heinous attacks. Eastleigh, which has a strong Somali community, particularly Somali immigrants, was seen as a potential source of terrorism. The intelligence operation known as "Operation Sanitization of Eastleigh" was designed as a "cleaning exercise" to remove supporters of Al-Shabaab off Kenyan soil. There is scant evidence that people were detained due to this investigation. There is minimal evidence that anyone arrested as part of the anti-operation has been charged with offenses, including violence (Abrozik, 2018). In response to pressure to "do something about the rising threat, the government chose a more visible and dramatic strategy to demonstrate its readiness and competence to ensure people's safety."

Statement of the Problem

Although numerous studies on CVE existed, evidence on the effect of multiagency security operations was scanty and not adequately contextualized. Observed threats such as extremism, global systematized crime, and other types of crime continue to survive, jeopardizing the desired peace (Sivenbring, Andersson & Malmros, 2019). Despite adoption of multiagency security approach by the government, the battle against VE in Nairobi City County, Kenya had remained unresolved.

Investigations had been carried out with respect to multi-agency operations and CVE. However, these studies had underlying research gaps. Abwaku (2017) found that coordination structures as well as community mobilization contributed to the countering of violent extremism within the context of Kenya. Ambrozik (2018) found that collaborative governance largely existed in communities with interested parties who were also able to participate in CVE. Feve and Dews (2019) documented that resource mobilization played a key role in CVE in the context of United States. Mwaniki (2019) reported that coordination of structures related activities contributed to the countering CVE in Kenya. Sheridan and Corps (2022) reported that coordination structures reduced vulnerability towards VE in Niger. Notably, some of the studies were focused on developed nations hence based on varying socio-economic characteristics as compared to a developing nation like Kenya; this in turn limited the applicability of findings from such studies to Kenya. Despite some studies focusing on Kenya and other developing countries, no country regardless of underlying status of being a developed or developing country, were the same. Also, coordination structures, resource mobilization and community mobilization were not collectively explored in these studies.

In view of these gaps, the study aimed to focus on the effect of coordination structures, resource mobilization and community mobilization all within multiagency framework in CVE in Nairobi City County Kenya, hence adding significantly to related existing body of literature.

Objectives of the Study

The study was guided by the following objectives:

    i.   To examine the effect of coordination structures within the multiagency framework on countering violent extremism in Nairobi City County, Kenya.

    ii.   To determine the effect of resource mobilization within the multiagency framework on countering violent extremism in Nairobi City County, Kenya.

    iii.   To assess the effect of community mobilization within the multiagency framework on countering violent extremism in Nairobi City County, Kenya.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Theoretical Framework

By incorporating the public in administration, the Kenyan government has adopted a very inclusive goal-setting method that supports establishing plans and policies and monitoring and analyzing government services. Considering the danger of VE, several ideas have been actively debated among policy, law enforcement, security, jail, probation, and education players in Kenya (Bertrand, 2018). The complexity of countering violent extremism, the heterogeneity of the phenomena of violent acts, and the very real obstacles to intelligence sharing within multiagency groupings have all been overlooked in this hypothesis. This research looked at many theories linked to multiagency operations on countering VE in Kenya, including securitization theory and realism theory, all relevant to multiagency security operations in battling VE in Kenya.

Securitization Theory

Ole Waever coined the term "securitization theory," It divided opinion between those who believed threats were objective and those who believed threats were subjective. The fundamental ideas of securitization theory arose with the end of the Cold War (Howell & Richter-Montpetit, 2020; Balzacq, 2019). There was a discussion between 'narrowers' and 'wideners' about defining security in international relations. The idea was that the narrowers were worried about national security and spent long durations analyzing military and political stability between the US and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Wideners tried to encompass threats that were not military and harm individuals instead of nations. Howell and Richter-Montpetit (2020) integrated notions like identity and cultural concerns, regional, and human security to broaden the security agenda. According to Balzacq (2019), feminists played a crucial part in questioning the concept that the State is entirely responsible for providing security and has no influence on production; this became feminism's broad agenda. Contrarily, the State was often the foundation of women's concerns (Balzacq, 2019). Broadening the subject from a feminist viewpoint, women and gender were placed at the security calculations heart, demonstrating how security, conflict, and gender were all entangled.

It was an enormous step forward in developing a more indepth security strategy. It has become the securitization theory's main argument (Howell & Richter-Montpetit, 2020). The premise of Bertrand (2018) is that the securitization theory does not consider the factors that lead a person to classify something as a security concern. The theory does not explain why decisions to classify anything as a security risk are made, according to the other underlying premise, which also holds that designating a problem as a security danger is an arbitrary process. The theory makes a number of additional assumptions after that. Balzacq (2019). It is presumed that security is created by subjective representations of participants in international politics who have a socially valid voice, such as state officials, non-state organizations, communities, and even individuals. Bertrand (2018) argued that a comprehensive, complicated, and globally coordinated reaction is required in this situation. Securitization theory will be used to understand better how effective is multiagency security operations in preventing violent extremism.

Kenya has been clear in its condemnation of violent extremism and support for a holistic approach to avoiding radicalization and violent extremism contributing to terrorism (Hansen ,2020). As a result, the concept is crucial in this study's understanding of violent extremism. The theory can be utilized to comprehend how funding for preventing violent extremism in Kenya works. To successfully prevent and counter violent extremism, coordination and cooperation amongst diverse government actors are essential (multiagency operations) (Hansen, 2020). As a result, it's crucial to figure out whether the pattern of violence is objective or subjective. As a result, the securitization theory is being used by whole-of-government actors to better tackle extremism.

Realism Theory

The realist viewpoint is connected to early Greek scholars like Thucydides. Other experts, such as Hans Morgenthau, have continued investigating and refining the theory (Chrisman, 2019). Realism depicts the State as the most important player in international relations, and it does it rationally. According to Chrisman (2019), the theory claims that in international politics, governments' interests guide their behavior. Because the international system is characterized by anarchy at best, governments must regard self-help as a critical priority to protect their interests inside that anarchic maze. The United Nations (UN) put the responsibility of national security on governments, which is instructive (Hoddy, 2019). From this vantage point, it is definite why nations are the sole legal entities with a monopoly on utilizing force and why they have created a number of security services to protect the other interests of the government.

Governments are primarily concerned with their security, according to the United States National Security and Strategic Policy, which goes on to explain that states foster security measures to keep the country safe. The traditional notion of security as dependent on military capacity is the result of all the prior factors. This study's focus, the fight against violent extremism in Kenya, has led to the development, bolstering, and activation of multiagency operations to defend the nation.

Realists believe that self-help is essential in the fight against violent extremism, as evidenced by the State's large annual national budget allocation to security multiagency initiatives (Chrisman, 2019).

The idea, it is assumed, maintains that reality is unaffected by change, despite the fact that both reality and the security challenges that nations face and must address are always evolving. Although the realism theory acknowledges the significant role of force, it does not explain how and why many multiagency agencies must cooperate to achieve the ultimate goal of state security (Hoddy, 2019).To evaluate the influence of community mobilization on countering violent extremism in Kenya in addition to determining the effects of resource mobilization in countering violent extremism in Kenya, the study presents the realism theory to explain the role and necessity of synchronization among Kenya's multiple security institutions responsible for countering and responding to violent extremist's threats.

Empirical Review

Multi-agency Operations

According to Steen-Tveit (2020) and Lusiola (2021), an appropriate and functional structure to improve the partnership's efficiency and effectiveness cannot be overstated. As a result, building and implementing a multiagency organization necessitates various considerations at both the strategic and operational levels (Steen-Tveit, 2020). Kenya's government has approved multiagency operations to confront the challenge of nationally organized violent extremism within its borders. As a result, emphasize the role and importance of multiagency operations in addressing security challenges.

The choice, which highlights the value of multiagency operations, is the result of collaboration and coordination between a number of security and governmental organizations, including legal counsel, national security services, and other pertinent national organizations inside the nation. (Lusiola, 2021). In a way likely to answer the study question, what are the consequences of coordinating structures to fight violent extremism in Kenya? Roles must be made clear and agencies' and their teams' commitment to the various coordinated multiagency operations must be ensured at all levels. Additionally, across the board, make sure that the structures are designed to foster mutual respect and trust among the various multiagency operations. The multiagency establishment's structure promotes communication between and among the agencies. To answer the question, it is thought that achieving the goal will require assuring equity among partners while also appreciating differences (Steen-Tveit, 2020).

The idea of (Shahparvari et al., 2021), confirms that securing dedication entails conveying the importance of each agency's contribution and convincing them to give their utmost to the mission. The multiagency operation team may not be able to fulfill its goals unless trust and mutual respect

are fostered among the many actors through expertise sharing and equitable resource distribution (Shahparvari *et al*., 2021). Lastly, such collaborations must include collaborative training and acknowledgment of individual competence to develop understanding across the many agencies and increase the likelihood of achieving goals. The success of multiagency operation teams depends on four factors: improving the agencies' coordination where the agencies work together methodically; improving the agencies' communication, which should encompass complete multidirectional information disclosure; improving the agencies' cooperation among the various actors to employ joint action in boosting mutual working relationships and improving the agencies' coordination. The multiagency operation structure must work as a unit instead of a patchwork of independent constituents. That appears to be the overall conclusion and finding of the studies and works presented here by various authors. Although the civil-military relationship structure of a nation is essential to the effectiveness of multiagency operations, it is occasionally overlooked when evaluating the armed forces' performance. Those are engaged in challenging expeditionary processes (Shahparvari *et al*., 2021). As a result, clear distinctions between their different realms of responsibility are critical for Kenyan military and aid workers to succeed in managing complicated emergencies. In reviewing previous disasters like the Haiti earthquake and Hurricane Katrina and researchers found that several civic agencies and the military worked together to help victims. The success levels that were attained depended on coordination amongst all of the entities involved in disaster response. Stereotypes and prejudices arose as a result of different working styles between civilian and military personnel and a lack of knowhow of every actor's organizational identity, creating a barrier to cooperation during rescue operations.

The National Police Service (NPS), the National Intelligence Service (NIS), and the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) are among the organizations that have formed multiagency operations to combat violent extremism, and have reaped significant benefits from their efforts (Nguyen, 2019). Massive seminars on violent extremism and, related topics are offered by multilateral training institutes such as, the International Peace Support Training Center (IPSTC) in Karen. Multiagency activities have the strategic goals of fostering a regional view on security issues, building littoral capabilities, and assisting African Union and UN peacekeeping operations in Kenya and neighboring regions (Nguyen, 2019). For example, they assisted in the development of a cooperative logistics strategy to assist in the lifting and support of Ugandan troops in AMISOM. In addition, the multiagency operations benefit the broader East African area by strengthening regional states' counter-violent extremism capacities (Weine *et al*., 2018). Multiagency operations and soft policies are also used to take action against violent extremism. Policies that target unemployment, illiteracy, and poverty reduction help to achieve this. This research aims to learn how community mobilization and resource facilitation affect multiagency counter-violent extremism operations.

According to (Romaniuk *et al*., 2018) Multiagency operations are gaining traction and seem to be on the rise. These partnerships involving public and private law enforcement organizations as well as other important parties. The study of several multiagency operations reveals that there are

crucial aspects to consider when creating a multiagency operation to combat violent extremism. Due to the diversity of perspectives and perspectives that are brought in by the numerous agents, multiagency security operations, contrarily to operations conducted by individual security agencies, are better suited to detect and accurately define the target violent extremism (Yanagawa *et al*., 2019).

The availability of funds and resources influences whether or not a multiagency operation is used to combat violent extremism. Individualized security operations are typically more expensive, especially when all arms of the security services are expected to contribute. Take the war against violent extremism or drug trafficking, for example. The engagement of several security services is crucial in such situations (Romaniuk *et al*., 2018). To cover and substantially minimize the overall operational costs of setting up and maintaining the level of funds and resources necessary for efficacious operation, multiagency agreements incorporating formalization and integration are essential. These costs are likely to be higher in cases when attempts are made to create an enhanced separation between the various units. Increased permanency can also be more resource-intensive. It is difficult for the police to work alone and restore order while also combating violent extremism (Ambrozik, 2018).

Other security agencies, like the military, are in the same boat. In order to achieve coherence among security actors as opposed to dissonance and disconnectedness, which might lower the likelihood of success during operations, cooperative, multiagency operations are essential. This study's goal was to investigate how resource facilitation affects multiagency operations in the fight against violent extremism.

Countering Violent Extremism

CVE notion was developed in Europe after the attacks in Madrid. Countering violent extremism proponents usually portray the strategy as "soft" approach in view of responding to the fear of Islamist homegrown terrorism (Gielen, 2019). Many programs of countering violent extremism view people to be potential terrorists based on disproven methods and criteria. The first stands as extremist ideology which stands as a precursor to terrorism as well as its driver (Koehler, 2016). Despite this proposition having some intuitive appeal to an extent, it has been disregarded (Koehler, 2016). Various individuals have views which are considered as "extreme" and never act violently. Secondly, another disproven notion of CVE relates to the notion that there lies predictable path relating to terrorism, and those potential terrorists are characterized by identifiable markers (Gielen, 2019).

Across Europe, CVE programme have since rapidly developed and evaluating the preventive interventions and programmes have not really simultaneously developed (Gielen, 2019). The European Union's counterterrorism strategy from the year 2005 was based on four pillars which were: to protect, prevent, respond and pursue. The United Nation's global anti-terrorism strategy

advocated having a holistic strategy which encompasses the conditions that are conducive towards acts of terrorism (Silke & Veldhuis, 2017).

Coordination Structures and Countering Violent Extremism

Abwaku (2017) assessed the countering of violent extremism within the context of Kenya. These research topics, which included what global plans, activities, and problems there are for CVE, were the focus of the study. Also, is and has been the public engagement role to counter violent extremism in Africa. In Kenya, there are both opportunities for and obstacles to successful public participation in the fight against violent extremism. The study's objectives were then created from these. The study used the liberal and relative deprivation hypotheses. The research included both quantitative and qualitative research procedures. According to reports, Kenya is one of the first African nations to coordinate CVE activities at the national level. It was noted in the research, the need for Kenya as a country to ensure the strengthening of mutually beneficial partnerships cutting across the community, the state as well as non-state actors so as to help in fostering and developing resilience against extremism (radicalization). The study reported that resultant synergy existing among state with other partners bring about unity and harmony of purpose, hence bringing about coherent strategy at the national level which is a combination of both hard and soft national power to address violent extremism.

Mwaniki (2019) studied coordination of structure related activities and countering of violent terrorism and extremism in Africa with focus on Kenya. The existing multi-stakeholder approaches as well as underlying difficulties experienced in countering VE and terrorism was examined for Kenya. The study was underpinned by human need theory. Based on the study findings, coordination of structures related activities contributed to the countering the acts of violent extremism and terrorism. The study identified the malfunction of state-driven strategies to stop the spread of violent extremism conducts, and as a result, the existing policy to combat terrorism and violent extremism was changed to multi-stakeholder led strategies. It was recommended that the Kenyan government link with more stakeholders and policies which tend to alienate marginalized communities should be avoided. In addition, the current study established the contribution of community mobilization in countering violent extremism in Kenya, hence adding significantly to related existing body of literature.

Sheridan and Corps (2022) studied how coordination structures reduce vulnerability towards violent extremism in Niger. In this research, mixed methods were applied. This was based on the influence of USAID-funded Preventing Violent Extremism Actions via higher Social Cohesion Efforts (PEACE) program was examined by Mercy Corps in the context of Tillabéri region of Niger. The projects include infrastructure rehabilitation, dialogue and mediation initiatives, livelihoods support, natural resource management as well as cultural events with a view of strengthening social cohesion across citizen-government, ethnic as well as other lines of division.

This in turn helped in making it a challenge for VE groups in exploiting the differences in identity and perception of marginalization.

According to comments from 1,800 respondents, the program had a beneficial influence on social cohesiveness; nevertheless, only specific activities-built trust across groups. Notably, respondents participated more when there were more peace-related activities of any kind taking place in their village, and their trust in those communities increased. The study established that cultural activities and infrastructure projects positively and significantly impacted, however, livelihoods interventions and mediation did not. The findings are attributed to the notion that the activities led to the engagement of more people, hence requiring greater coordination among the various existing groups.

Resource Mobilization and Countering Violent Extremism

Yanagawa (2019) researched on resource mobilization and countering violent extremism. The study was based on a review approach. The study acknowledge that resource facilitation affects multiagency operations in terms of achieving the objectives for which the multiagency were intended to which is countering violent extremism. This approach according to the study has been strongly acclaimed in some places as a means of planning and conducting complicated, comprehensive initiatives. It was further contended that multiagency operations have been more thorough and effective in tackling community needs than single-agency ones. Notably, the research was grounded on a literature review method based various studies.

Mwaniki (2019) evaluated the evolving counterterrorism and extremism strategies used in Africa with an emphasis on Kenya. The project aimed to provide fresh, useful, and practical knowledge to combat violent extremism and terrorism in Kenya and throughout Africa. It was looked at how international counterterrorism strategies affected the fight against terrorism and VE. Additionally, the effects of implemented counterterrorism and violent extremism methods were further investigated in the African setting. Additionally, a study of the existing multi-stakeholder approaches as well as underlying difficulties experienced in countering VE and terrorism was examined for Kenya. Human need theory was used to underpin this study which captures the pull and push related factors which serves as the rational of adopting the various multi-stakeholder approaches as expounded by John Burton in addressing violent extremism and terrorism. In view of the results, it was reported that efficient multi-stakeholder proceudres bring about a decrease in the difficulties experienced in executing CT and CVE strategies within Kenya.
Notably, the acts of violent extremism and terrorism escalated over time which made learning institutions, worship places, several bus terminals and shopping malls to become targeted places. The study found that state-led efforts to stop the spread of violent extremist activities had failed, thus the current strategy to combat terrorism and violent extremism has been changed to involve several stakeholders.

Feve and Dews (2019) examined the connections between resource mobilization and preventing violent extremism in the US context. The study's methodology involved comparing and contrasting various tactics for preventing and combating violent extremism. The study also aimed to investigate how these tactics reflected the United Nations' principles and best (effective) practices. A sample of 19 national strategies was taken. The study's findings favor resource mobilization in the fight against violent extremism while using the UN Office guidelines on Counter-Terrorism based on "Reference Guide: Developing National and Regional Action Plans to Prevent Violent Extremism" as a joint basis for analysis. The study, which was a comparative examination, was notable for its heavy attention to the USA, which is regarded as a developed country. In contrast, the focus of the ongoing research will be Kenya which is categorized as a developing country, hence characterized by varying socio-cultural and socio-economic conditions.

Specifically, with respect to the underlying specific objective, this study aimed to ascertain the function of resource mobilization in CVE in the context of Nairobi City County, Kenya.

Community Mobilization and countering violent extremism

Abwaku (2017) studied the linkages between community mobilization and countering of violent extremism within Kenya. The study applied both Liberal and Relative Deprivation theories and qualitative as well as quantitative research methodology were used, hence the research was based on a mixed method. According to reports, Kenya is one of the first African nations to coordinate CVE activities at the national level. In Kenya, it was discovered that community mobilization was essential for battling violent extremism. In view of the study results, it was recommended that there is the need to build the capacity of local initiatives towards designing and delivering sustainable and community-owned, CVE programs.

The need to construct effective counter-narratives, have rehabilitation of returned fighters, harness the influence and power of families, men and women in the community while developing resilience as a community was stressed in the study as a way to combat the ideology of extremism. The current study further examined how resource mobilization contributes to the countering of violent extremism, thus making the study unique.

Ambrozik (2018) assessed the responses of community stakeholders in view of countering violent extremism locally in the context of USA. The study noted that despite federal efforts in empowering communities towards forming governance networks at the local level for purposes of developing and implementing collaborative countering violent extremism (CVE) programs, there is still rare local CVE governance networks. The study continued to look for an answer to the query, "Why do CVE governance networks exist only in specific communities?" based on a qualitative approach. Further evaluations of three important factors included facilitation, interest

in CVE, and capacity for engagement. According to the study, facilitation, interest in CVE, and involvement capability all tend to improve the chances of CVE governance network formation, which is why they only form in some communities and not others when it comes to CVE governance networks. It was discovered that communities with stakeholders who engage in CVE and are able to partake primarily have collaborative governance. Notably, the three factors lead to avenues of collaborative governance.

Sheridan and Corps (2022) set out to investigate how community mobilization strengthens social cohesion in Niger while lowering vulnerability to violent extremism. The study attempted to discover whether bringing individuals together towards cooperating on projects helps to solve shared needs and brings about improvement social cohesion in conflict-affected regions. The study used a combination of qualitative and quantitative methodologies, or mixed methods.

The Mercy Corps' Higher Social Cohesion Efforts (PEACE) program's Preventing Violent Extremism Actions was evaluated in the context of the Tillabéri region of Niger in an effort to close the violent extremism gap. In order to develop the community, the projects range from livelihood support to natural resource management to infrastructure restoration to cultural activities. This in turn helped in making it a challenge for VE groups in exploiting the differences in identity and perception of marginalization. Based on responses from 1,800 respondents it was reported that the program positively impacted on social cohesion, however, trust between groups was only increased by certain activities. Notably, higher peace efforts of any form in a village, resulted higher participation of respondents while the trust in such communities improved. Notably, community mobilization led to improvement in countering security challenges (violent extremism). The importance of community mobilization in multiagency operations to counter violent extremism in Kenya was the subject of this research.

Conceptual Framework

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│  Multi-agency Operations             │
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│  │  Coordination Structures       │  │
│  │     • Joint operations         │  │
│  │     • Command                  │  │
│  │     • Planning                 │  │
│  │     • Deployment               │  │
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┌──────────────────────────────────┐
│  Countering Violent Extremism    │
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study embraced a descriptive exploration plan particularly in light of the fact that it permits the researcher a chance to portray the participants in an exact manner with next to no obstruction while simultaneously not impacting their reactions at all. To conduct this study, a mixture of qualitative and quantitative research methods was employed. This mix was helpful in improving the outcomes and discoveries of the concentrate by guaranteeing that the deficiencies of one methodology were balanced by the strong points of the other. Independent variables to be adopted in this study included; community mobilization, coordination of structures and resource mobilization as captured by the term multiagency operations. Consequently, the dependent variable was countering violent extremism.

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mobilization as captured by the term multiagency operations. Consequently, the dependent variable was countering violent extremism. The study focused on 920 security actors, including security policy makers from the state branch's administrative headquarters in Nairobi City County, Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI), National Intelligence Services (NIS), Kenya Defense Forces (KDF), and Anti-Terror Police Units. 920 individuals established the study's target population, comprising a sample of 120 members of the Anti-Terror Police Units, 89 KDF, 35 NIS, and 35 personnel of the DCI. These were the most significant security organizations involved in the multiagency operations to combat violent extremism.

The sample size therefore, was 279 participants determined through the Yamane (1967) formula. Questionnaires were employed in amassing primary data. Data from the whole sample size were collected using 279 questionnaires. The study's objectives were covered in the questionnaire. The data collection tools included both open-ended and closed-ended questions. While the closed questions provided respondents with a list of possibilities from which they could select the one that best explained their thinking in regard to the study topic, the open-ended questions were designed to allow respondents to express their thoughts on the questions presented. The use of questionnaires was deemed useful because it was cheap compared to other instruments, user-friendly and straightforward to assess due to their rapid availability. Additionally, when compared to doing trials, these two strategies save time and money.

Semi-structured questionnaires were used to collect data. The questionnaire was divided into two sections: part A and part B. Part A of the questionnaire provided background information about the respondent, while part B included associated questions about multiagency counter-violent extremism operations. The questionnaires were delivered to the 279 respondents that were randomly selected.

The researcher employed quantitative methodology to analyze the data. The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 24 was used for the study's descriptive statistics and multiple regression analysis. The descriptive analysis consisted of frequencies, means, percentages, and standard deviation. By writing code, qualitative data was examined using thematic analysis. To develop sound observations and conclusions, this needed methodically categorizing, assessing, and interpreting qualitative data acquired from questionnaires. The precise objectives and research questions of the study informed the multiple regression analysis that was performed and examined. Tables and charts were used to document the results for simplicity of interpretation and comprehension. Statistical significance of the effectiveness of coordination structures, resource mobilization and community mobilization in countering violent extremism in Nairobi City County Kenya were ascertained using the threshold of 0.05 significance level. Finally, a report was published outlining the study's findings in detail.

The following equation made up the multiple regression model:

$$CVE = \beta_0 + \beta_1 CS_1 + \beta_2 RM_2 + \beta_3 CM_3 + \varepsilon$$

Where:

CVE = Countering Violent Extremism

β_0 = Constant

CS = Coordination Structures

RM = Resource Mobilization

CM = Community Mobilization

β_1, β_2, β_3 = Coefficients of determination

RESULTS AND FINDINGS

The researcher administered 279 questionnaires to security actors, including security policymakers from the state branch's administrative headquarters in Nairobi City County, Anti-Terror Police Units, Kenya Defense Forces (KDF), National Intelligence Services (NIS), and Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI). Of the 279 administered questionnaires, 261 were completed and collected, representing a 93.6 percent response rate.

On age distribution, approximately 15 percent of the respondents were 20-29, and 49 percent were 30 to 39 years. About 29 percent of the respondents were aged between 40 and 49 years, whereas 7 percent were over 50. The findings indicated that most respondents (nearly half) were 30 to 39 years old, whereas the least were over 50. The respondents' differing age distribution also suggested different insights pertaining to multiagency security operations' effectiveness in countering violent extremism in Nairobi County and increased generalizability of the obtained results.

On gender distribution, approximately 14 percent of the respondents were female, whereas 86 percent were male. The findings meant that the study results primarily represented male security actors. On Marital Status, more than three-quarters of the respondents (85 percent) were married. Approximately, 9 percent were single, 4 percent were divorced, and 2 percent were separated. Therefore, the greatest number of the respondents was married, whereas the least were separated. On educational qualification, most respondents (33 percent) highest educational qualification was an undergraduate degree. More than a quarter of the respondents (29 percent) had attained a Master's degree, 20 percent had reached the certificate level, 14 percent had a diploma, and 4 percent had a PhD qualification. Despite the variation in educational qualifications, the respondents' educational qualifications meant they were eligible to complete the questionnaires and provide reliable responses suitably.

Knowledge of Countering Violent Extremism

All the respondents had knowledge of countering violent extremism. The results meant that all the respondents were fit to provide accurate answers to the questions provided on multiagency security

operations' effectiveness in countering violent extremism in Nairobi County. Consequently, the results inferred increased reliability of the study's results in realizing the research objectives.

All the respondents answered that their work experience gave them a good knowledge of countering violent extremism. The findings demonstrated good knowledge and competencies in countering violent extremism, thus validating their fit to provide reliable insights into multiagency security operations effectiveness on countering violent extremism in Nairobi County.

Coordination Structures of Countering Violent Extremism

The study asked the respondents to specify their degree of conformity with the statements in Table 4.1 below. A five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree) measured their responses.

Table 4.1: Coordination Structures of Countering Violent Extremism

Statements	Mean	Standard Deviation
The joint forces can together help fight extremism	4.43	0.78
In respect to coordination, there is mutual understanding on the operations to be carried out	3.79	1.17
There is deployment of armed staff in strategic area	3.72	1.09
Proper plans are always in place to carry out operations	3.47	1.04
The public are aware of coordinated force put together to fight extremist	3.19	1.25

Source: Researcher (2023)

The respondents agreed that the joint forces could help fight extremism (Mean = 4.43, SD = 0.78), and there was a mutual understanding of the coordinated operations to be performed (Mean = 3.79, SD = 1.17). They also agreed that armed personnel were deployed in strategic areas (Mean = 3.72, SD = 1.09) and that proper plans were always in place to conduct operations (Mean = 3.47, SD = 1.04). Alternatively, their responses indicated they were indifferent regarding the public's awareness of the coordinated force assembled to fight extremism. The low standard deviations of approximately across the responses meant uniformity in the answers. These results inferred a need to raise the public's awareness of the available, coordinated structures to counter violent extremism.

Additionally, the respondents were asked to indicate the various plan structures utilized to coordinate operations. The open-ended nature of the question permitted the respondents to provide their insights and opinions on the question. Eight themes emerged from the responses. The eight themes were further consolidated (where similar themes were grouped) into three primary themes. The first theme entailed the multiagency framework. Most of the respondents (117 respondents) identified a well-structured multiagency framework as utilized to coordinate operations. The second theme encompassed a single joint operation center, where one command center guided the operations of various teams and functioned as a liaison between different stakeholders. Seventy-four respondents identified this theme, making it the second most common theme among the

respondents. The third theme comprised the strategic level. Thirty-nine respondents identified strategic levels and teams as coordinating operations to counter violent extremism. Therefore, the findings indicated that the primary plan structures for countering violent extremism were a multiagency framework, a single joint command center, and strategic teams.

The findings resonated with NCTC's purpose and means of operation. NCTC (2023) utilizes a multiagency framework to coordinate national counter-terrorism measures that disrupt, deter, detect, and prevent violent extremist and terrorist acts. The institution also utilizes various legal frameworks and policies at the strategic and tactical levels to counter violent extremism in the country.

Alternatively, the study asked the respondents to identify joint coordination forces' challenges. Evaluating their answers generated four common themes. The first was limited resources, where 184 respondents identified insufficient funds and budgetary constraints, funding issues, personnel, equipment, and materials to efficiently counter violent extremism as the main challenge the joint coordination forces experienced. The second comprised different doctrines. Ninety-eight respondents recognized differing policies, methods, and ways of doing things as significant challenges affecting the joint coordination forces. The third theme consisted of political factors, where 44 respondents identified a lack of political goodwill and political interference as challenges the joint coordination forces faced. The last theme entailed leadership wrangles, where 38 respondents identified leadership conflicts and different chains of command and bureaucracies as a challenge for the joint coordination forces. Therefore, the main challenges the joint coordination forces faced included limited resources, different doctrines, political factors, and leadership wrangles.

Resources Mobilization on Countering Violent Extremism

The study asked the respondents to specify the ways they mobilized resources to counter violent extremism. The initially identified five-point Likert scale measured their responses.

Table 1: Resources Mobilization on Countering Violent Extremism

Statements	Mean	Standard Deviation
Should the government increase human, material and financial resources	4.68	0.54
The programs are also funded by international organizations	4.00	1.03
There is available manpower to support this fight	3.55	0.88
Government budget yearly funding for the fight against extremists in the country	3.51	1.17
The current program and resources are efficient and adequate in countering violent extremist	3.13	1.08

Materials are always available and in place for execution on command	2.88	1.05

Table 1 shows that the respondents strongly agreed that the government needed to increase human, material, and financial resources (Mean = 4.68, SD = 0.54). The findings suggested an inadequacy of materials at multiagency institutions to combat violent extremism. They also agreed that the programs were funded by international organizations (Mean = 4.00, SD = 1.03), they had available human resources to support the fight against violent extremism (Mean = 3.55, SD = 0.88), and a government budget yearly funding for the fight (Mean = 3.51, SD = 1.17). The findings inferred to the availability of human and financial resources, which brought about the question of the adequacy and access to these resources. However, they were indifferent about the adequacy and efficiency in countering violent extremism (Mean = 3.13, SD = 1.08) and the availability and accessibility of materials for execution on command (Mean = 2.88, SD = 1.05). These findings inferred that there was a need for the government to increase resource availability and accessibility to increase the efficiency in countering violent extremism.

Complementarily, for clarification, the study asked the respondents to specify the resources that were not available for the fight against violent extremism. Four predominant themes emerged from their responses. These themes comprised inadequate equipment, funds, technology, and human capital. On equipment, the respondents stipulated that they needed more modern equipment, needed more surveillance equipment to complement human intelligence, vehicles, and communication gadgets. Regarding funds, the respondents reported inadequate funds, poor funding issues, and inadequate budgets in the multiagency operations. Concerning technology, the respondents reported inadequate communication networks and means of reaching those at the grassroots, a real-time information-sharing platform, and other technological applications such as modern tracking and recording devices. Lastly, twenty-one respondents stated that they had inadequate intelligence officers and overall human capital to counter violent extremism efficiently. Similarly, Guyo (2021) recognized the need to increase human capital in countering violent extremism in Kenya. Specifically, the study asserted that the government should increase their partnerships with local traditional elders, religious, and political leaders to portray a sense of collective union in countering violent extremism. Supplementarily, Idris (2020) endorsed the need to include women officers, informants, and community officers in the fight against violent extremism.

Community Mobilization on Countering Violent Extremism

The study sought to determine the measures established to mobilize and protect communities. Table 2 indicates a variation in the measures employed in mobilizing communities.

Table 2: Community Mobilization on Countering Violent Extremism

Statements	Mean	Standard Deviation

Government should provide alternatives to strengthen the community resilience	4.30	0.69
Are religious leaders and groups involved with this measure	3.85	0.93
There is availability of consultations provided for the community	3.61	1.15
Communities are involved countering violent extremist in partnership with the government	3.51	1.09
Community participates to protect themselves against violent extremist	2.98	1.78

The respondents agreed that the government needed to offer alternatives to strengthen community resilience (Mean = 4.30, SD = 0.69) and religious leaders and groups needed to get involved with countering violent extremism (Mean = 3.85, SD = 0.93). The results matched the earlier findings that demonstrated for further recruitment to enhance the fight against violent extremism in Nairobi City County. Notably, the respondents specified that the multiagency forces should integrate religious leaders and groups and increase community resilience activities and programs in their operations to efficiently counter violent extremism. They also agreed that consultations were provided for the community (Mean = 3.61, SD = 1.15) and that communities in partnership with the government were involved in countering violent extremism (Mean = 3.51, SD = 1.09). The findings inferred a partnership between the multiagency forces and local communities in countering violent extremism in Nairobi City County. Alternatively, they were indifferent to the public's high awareness of violent extremism within the nation (Mean = 3.14, SD = 1.16) and the community's participation in protecting themselves against violent extremists (Mean = 2.98, SD = 1.78). These findings suggested a need to increase the public's awareness and participation in protecting themselves against violent extremism. Besides, these findings resonated with Mandaville and Nozell's (2017) findings on the need to engage religious groups and leaders in the fight against violent extremism, for they could help inform the implementation and design of CVE solutions.

The study also asked the respondents to identify the measures the government had implemented to protect communities. Their responses were grouped into three predominant themes. The first theme comprised community policing programs. Sixty-four respondents articulated that the government had implemented community policing programs, especially the Nyumba Kumi initiative, to protect communities. The second theme entailed the deployment of security personnel in strategic extremist areas. Forty-seven respondents stated that the government had deployed security personnel and informants to gather intelligence to help protect communities. The last theme comprised sensitization programs, where twenty-six respondents acknowledged that the government implemented sensitization programs, including media campaigns against violent extremism, to protect communities.

These findings matched NCTC's approaches to countering violent extremism in Kenya. The multiagency institution had implemented a bottom-up CVE strategy by establishing 4 County Action Plans to counter and prevent violent extremism (NCTC, 2023). The institution had also sensitized and trained over 100,000 Kenyans in risk areas and intelligence-informed radicalization

hotspots between July 2016 to June 2020 on their role in security (NCTC, 2023). These results established that the organization was committed to mobilizing communities to counter violent extremism in the country.

Lastly, the study asked the respondents why community involvement and participation were important. Five themes emerged from the respondents' answers. First, the respondents recognized the community's understanding of the community dynamics as justifying community involvement and participation. Second, the respondents posited that community involvement and participation educated the community and increased awareness of violent extremism and measures to counter violent extremism. Third, they established that community involvement and participation reduced the community's recruitment to radicalization. Fourth, they stated that community involvement and participation increased information sharing, gathering, and provision, hence contributing to countering violent extremism. Fifth, they asserted that community involvement and participation improved public relations and enhanced unity within the community. Therefore, the results demonstrated that community involvement and participation were important in understanding the community dynamics, increasing awareness of violent extremism, reducing radicalization rates, enhancing intelligence gathering, and boosting public relations and unity.

Similarly, OSCE (2020) verified that immense benefits stemmed from adopting a whole-of-society approach to countering violent extremism. The report demonstrated that some of the grievances that violent extremist groups exploit lay beyond the government's reach, and thus engaging the communities could help identify the individuals more vulnerable to radicalization and violent extremism and prevent their recruitment to violent extremist groups. The report also found that engaging communities in countering violent extremism fostered more understanding and trust and increased the effectiveness of strategies and policies aiming to counter violent extremism.

Countering Violent Extremism

The study sought to determine the extent to which multiagency operations countered violent extremism. Table 3 demonstrates the respondents' answers.

Table 3: Countering Violent Extremism

Statements	Mean	Standard Deviation
The multiagency security operations are efficient and effective	4.18	0.81
The multiagency operations respond to any violent attacks or threats is fast and productive	4.08	0.86
The multiagency operations are timely	3.96	0.74

The findings showed that the respondents agreed that multiagency operations were efficient and effective (Mean = 4.18, SD = 0.81) and responded to any violent attacks or threats fast and productively (Mean = 4.08, SD = 0.86). They also agreed that the multiagency operations were timely (Mean = 3.96, SD = 0.74). The standard deviations below 1 suggested that the respondents'

answers were highly similar, inferring a concurrence among them. These results further demonstrated that the multiagency operations were valuable in countering violent extremism in Nairobi City Council, Kenya. Supplementarily, a UN (2020) report found that implementing Kenya's multiagency framework for countering violent extremism had reinforced the government's capacity to disrupt, deter, and detect violent extremist activities.

Besides, the respondents were asked to provide any other comment. The primary themes from their responses included the need for good leadership, more funding, the government to invest more in multiagency cooperation, and put more effort into sensitizing communities concerning issues relating to violent extremism. These themes and comments matched the previous findings on joint coordination forces' challenges and the unavailable resources for the fight against violent extremism. The findings also resonated with Syokila's (2020) affirmation that the multiagency approach to combat violent extremism was still in its infancy phase and primarily a test flight to Kenya.

Inferential Statistics

Multiple Regression Analysis

The study conducted multiple regression analysis to examine the effect of coordination structures, resource mobilization, and community mobilization all within multiagency framework in countering violent extremism in Nairobi City County Kenya. Table 4 comprises the multiple regression model summary.

Table 4: Regression Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
.84	.71	.69	.45

The 0.84 R-value (the multiple correlation coefficient) suggested a strong positive association between multiagency security operations (coordination structures, resource mobilization, and community mobilization) and countering violent extremism. The R-Squared value (coefficient of determination) of 0.71 meant that the multiagency security operations (independent variable) could explain 71 percent of the variance in countering violent extremism (the dependent variable). The 0.69 Adjusted R-Square value suggested a 69 percent model accuracy where 69 percent of the data fit the regression model, inferring that the regression model was a good fit for the collected data. Table 5 below illustrates the obtained ANOVA results.

Table 5: ANOVA Results

	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	20.26	3	6.75	17.72	.000
Residual	97.92	257	.38		
Total	118.18	260			

The 0.000 p-value is below the 0.05 significance value, which supports rejecting the null hypothesis. These findings indicated that the multiagency security operations positively affected countering violent extremism in Nairobi County. These findings were further supported by the 17.72 F-value, which exceeded the critical F-value of 2.64, meaning that the test was statistically significantly.

Table 6 indicates the model's regression coefficients.

Table 6: Regression Coefficients

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
	B	Std. Error	Beta	T	Sig.
(Constant)	1.85	.32	.00	5.83	.000
Coordination Structures	.24	.06	.22	3.71	.000
Resources Mobilization	.22	.09	.17	2.48	.004
Community Mobilization	.15	.07	.16	2.22	.002

The β-values of 0.24, 0.22, and 0.15 for the coordination structures, resources mobilization, and community mobilization variables meant that an increase in the three independent variables increased the multiagency security operations effectiveness in countering violent extremism The 0.000, 0.004, and 0.002 p-values, which were below the 0.05 significance value, for the coordination structures, resources mobilization, and community mobilization variables suggested that there was a statistically significant relationship between coordination structures, resources mobilization, and community mobilization and the multiagency security operations effectiveness in countering violent extremism. The results meant a positive effect of coordination structures, resources mobilization, and community mobilization on countering violent extremism. Therefore, the multiagency security operations were effective in countering violent extremism in Nairobi City County, Kenya.

The study obtained the following equation from the regression coefficients, in Table 4.9 above:
$CVE = \beta_0 + 0.22CS_1 + 0.22RM_2 + 0.15CM_3 + \varepsilon$
Where:
CVE = Countering Violent Extremism

β_0 = Constant
CS = Coordination Structures
RM = Resource Mobilization
CM = Community Mobilization
β_1, β_2, β_3 = Coefficients of determination

Finally, the equation suggested that an increase in coordination structures, resources mobilization, and community mobilization within the multiagency framework increased the effectiveness of countering violent extremism.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

The study concluded that a good partnership existed between local communities and forces working within the multiagency security framework to counter violent extremism. However, a need existed for more recruitment of human resources, especially women, religious groups and leaders, and non-governmental entities, to enhance the effectiveness of multiagency security operations in countering violent extremism in Nairobi City County. Besides, the government needed to increase the public's awareness of the coordinated force assembled to fight extremism. Nonetheless, the study established that the existing coordination structures, resource mobilization, and community mobilization programs, activities, and efforts within the multiagency framework positively impacted the multiagency security operations effectiveness in countering violent extremism in Nairobi City County.

The study found that multiagency security operations effectively countered violent extremism in Nairobi. Multiagency security operations were timely and led to a fast response to any violent attacks or threats. Therefore, the study concluded that multiagency security operations were effective in countering violent extremism in Nairobi City County, Kenya. The next section discusses the recommendations drawn from these conclusions and the overall study results.

Recommendations

The study identified limited resources, different doctrines, political factors, and leadership wrangles as the primary challenges joint coordination forces face in their operations to counter violent extremism in Nairobi County. The government and the multiagency institution's leaders should commit to increasing resources, establishing clear standard operating procedures for the forces operating at the grassroots level, a clear leadership structure, and minimizing political interference to enhance multiagency security operations effectiveness in countering violent extremism in Nairobi. The government should also increase resource accessibility to multiagency

security actors to enhance their efficiency in countering violent extremism. The resources the government could equip the multiagency security actors with include modern surveillance equipment to complement human intelligence, optimal budgets, a real-time information-sharing platform, and more human capital. They should also increase recruitment to strengthen camps, ease soldiers' fatigue, increase efficiency, reduce injury rates, offer more support, expand the number of stations, and help create a greater ground to enhance the programs. Lastly, the multiagency security operations in Nairobi could also benefit from providing alternatives to strengthen community resilience, increasing the number of female security actors, and engaging religious leaders and groups in countering violent extremism.

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